Although Strom Thurmond switched to the Republican Party in 1964,
he became a kingmaker in the GOP just four years later. In this, the
fourth of five excerpts from "Ol' Strom: An Unauthorized Biography"
(Longstreet, 1998, 2003), authors Jack Bass and Marilyn W. Thompson
recount Thurmond's role in securing both the GOP presidential
nomination and the November election for Richard Nixon.
When Congress took its break in August 1968 for the national
political conventions, Strom Thurmond headed for Miami Beach to hold
the South for Richard Nixon... .
Thurmond understood that the civil rights revolution was
surpassing party loyalty as a political test in the South. He saw
Nixon as the vehicle for shifting the center of the GOP to the
right.
Thurmond's kingmaker role in Miami Beach symbolized that shift.
In the fall he slugged it out with Gov. George Wallace, whose
third-party effort threatened to derail Nixon. Only Thurmond
possessed the credibility among Southerners to tell them a
third-party protest was fruitless, and that "a vote for Wallace is a
vote for Humphrey." ...
The road to Miami Beach began four years earlier with Thurmond
switching parties and campaigning for Barry Goldwater... .
The mid-'60s were a period of political transition. The Voting
Rights Act of 1965 increased and energized black voting strength in
South Carolina. Simultaneously, it antagonized a majority of whites,
and Thurmond reflected their views. He attacked the measure as
vindictive in primarily targeting the states that had voted for
Goldwater... .
The Voting Rights Act eliminated literacy tests in states where
less than 50 percent of the voting age population voted in the 1964
presidential election; it required the states to get advance
clearance from the Justice Department before implementing any
changes in laws affecting voting... .
Democratic politicians in South Carolina suddenly needed black
votes to win and were "scared to death" of seeking them... .
Harry Dent returned to South Carolina in the fall of 1965, after
(Drake) Edens stepped down as GOP party chairman, and took over
planning the 1966 campaign. Dent was equally intent on building the
Republican Party, and the GOP fielded a full slate of candidates for
state and congressional offices, with Thurmond at the top of the
ticket... .
In the general election, Thurmond received 62 percent of the
vote. His strength at the top of the ticket almost spilled over
enough to topple Hollings in his bid for the remaining two years of
Johnston's term. Watson won re-election but all other Republicans
seeking major office lost... .
The most meaningful episode in the 1966 campaign occurred by
accident. Dent got Richard Nixon, then practicing law in New York,
to come to Columbia for a fund-raiser. Dent drove him back to the
Columbia Airport at 11 p.m. to meet a corporate jet and return to
New York... . When Dent probed, Nixon expressed reluctance about
running for president in 1968 because of George Wallace. The Alabama
governor planned to run, and Nixon saw him siphoning white voters on
the race issue who might otherwise opt for Nixon.
Dent's memory of the dialogue in his car with Nixon captures its
essence:
"George Wallace is going to run, and he's going to mess me
up."
"There's an answer to that."
"What?"
"Strom Thurmond."
"Strom Thurmond? How? What are you talking about?"
"Well, he was the State Rights candidate for president back in
1948, and he's known across the South. He's got a bigger image
across the South than George Wallace has." ...
Six months after sitting with Dent in his car at Columbia
Airport, Nixon sent an emissary to see him. Dent had spoken to
Thurmond and reaffirmed the senator would support Nixon... .
As Nixon feared, George Wallace had become the national lightning
rod for what became known as the "social issue." He planned a
third-party campaign that would tap into a working-class white
electorate, angry and frightened by civil rights and anti-war
protesters. He developed code words about race, including "welfare
chiselers" and "law and order."
More than any experience in Thurmond's past, the 1968 Republican
convention provided a political analogy to his glider ride into
Normandy. He went to Miami Beach fully committed, and survival
depended on quick and instinctive tactical decisions. Thurmond
believed that only Nixon could win the election for the Republicans,
and a GOP victory would move the country to the right.
When Nixon arrived by plane late Monday afternoon, Thurmond was
there to greet him and ready to warn him of serious problems. The
New York Times that morning ran a story speculating that, if
nominated, Nixon would choose one of three men as his running mate
-- New York's Rockefeller, New York City Mayor John Lindsay, or
Illinois Sen. Charles Percy. All represented the party's liberal
wing... .
Meanwhile, California Gov. Reagan dropped his coyness and
formally announced his candidacy for the nomination... .
On the convention floor, Dent could feel slippage. Columnist
Rowland Evans told him that Ohio Gov. James Rhodes said after
Reagan's announcement, "It's a new ball game." An insider told Dent
that Rhodes planned to throw Ohio's support to Reagan, with Rhodes
to become his running mate.
The Nixon convention staff had a designated person serving as a
listening post in each state delegation. About 9:30 p.m. on the
convention floor, Dent got a call from John Mitchell, who became
Nixon's campaign manager. Mitchell said Nixon could meet with
Thurmond that night or on Tuesday.
A little after 10 p.m., Mitchell greeted Dent, Buzhardt and
Thurmond, then took them by elevator to the 15th floor. They walked
up three flights of stairs to Nixon's remote suite... .
The important thing, to Dent and Buzhardt, was that the top man
understand Thurmond's commitment and reassure him that the South was
important to the campaign. Buzhardt "was personally afraid that Dick
Nixon would not understand how far out on a limb Strom Thurmond had
gotten without any assurance from him."
They had heard reports Nixon's basic strategy was to court the
urban vote and write off the South. Dent wanted the senator to "look
in Nixon's eyes ... Strom Thurmond needed to be sure in his own mind
that Richard Nixon had not written off the South." ...
The Thurmond strategy was to hold the South as solidly as
possible for Nixon, allowing him to lock up the nomination early on
the first ballot and not be pressured to make deals near the end of
the balloting on selecting a running mate. .‘.‘. (The 356 Southern
delegates amounted to more than half the number required for
nomination. Nixon would get 264 of them, almost three of every
four.) ...
When the subject of a vice presidential candidate came up, Nixon
made it clear he would pick his own running mate and told them, "I'm
not going to ram a man down the throat of any section of the
country." And that, Dent said, was "all Sen. Thurmond wanted or
needed to hear. It settled his own mind."
As the discussion with Nixon continued, Dent explained, "We said,
'Look, we can't carry your message for you. Senator Thurmond, just
one man, can't deliver it. Why don't you tell these people
directly?' He said, 'I'll be glad to. I'll answer any question that
anybody asks.' ...
Nixon met twice the next morning with Southern state delegations,
six states at a time.
There, Dent emphasized Thurmond's total commitment to Nixon and
added that three surveys taken in South Carolina showed him the
strongest among all voters of any Republican candidate. Bo Calloway
of Georgia introduced Thurmond, who told them, "We have no choice,
if we want to win, except to vote for Nixon. We must quit using our
hearts and start using our heads." He continued, "I love Reagan, but
Nixon's the one."
When Nixon spoke, he began by saying he supported civil rights.
As Dent put it, "He said, 'Let me make it straight at the outset,
that I am for civil rights and I have supported it and believe in
it.'" But Nixon also alluded to the riots that had occurred in
Northern cities. He said that most of the problems were caused by
"extremists of both races" and that a Nixon administration wouldn't
act "to satisfy some professional civil-rights group, or something
like that." ...
Later that Tuesday, before meeting with the South Carolina
delegation, Reagan met privately with Thurmond in the senator's
hotel room. Reagan asked Dent to leave, believing that one-on-one he
could persuade Thurmond to support him. Asked a few minutes after
the meeting what he told the California governor, Thurmond said, "I
told him I would support him next time." (Dent said that Thurmond
was unimpressed with Reagan, finding him shallow.) ...
The final crisis came Wednesday night when delegates streaming
into the Miami Beach Convention Center saw newsboys hawking a
"bulldog" edition of the next morning's Miami Herald with a banner
headline that Oregon Sen. Mark Hatfield would be the vice
presidential nominee: HATFIELD VEEP PICK.
The story sparked pandemonium again among the Southern
delegations. If true, it meant to them that Nixon had lied about
waiting to make a decision on whom to choose for vice president.
Dent raced from delegation to delegation, insisting the story was
false... . Nixon's floor leader at the convention, Maryland
Congressman Rogers Morton, stayed busy that evening scurrying with
Thurmond from one Southern delegation to another... .
Although Hatfield would appeal to the moderate wing of the party,
he was a Southern Baptist, and his main sponsor was the Rev. Billy
Graham, who joined Thurmond and 16 other influential politicians to
discuss the vice presidential pick with Nixon immediately after the
nomination... .
When Thurmond left the room, however, he handed Nixon a small
piece of paper with columns of names. He named five acceptables that
included Reagan and Congressman George Bush of Texas, two "no
objections" that included Maryland Gov. Spiro Agnew, and
"unacceptables" that included Hatfield. Thurmond had deposited his
veto... .
When Dent went through a receiving line at the end of the
convention, Nixon said he wanted him to come to Mission Bay, Calif.,
and work for him on the campaign... . Nixon agreed to Dent's running
a separate operation in the South, "Thurmond Speaks for
Nixon-Agnew." ...
Thurmond took his message from Miami Beach, that a vote for
Reagan was a vote for Rockefeller (because many of Nixon's
supporters outside the South would find Reagan too conservative) and
switched it in the general election to a vote for Wallace was a vote
for Humphrey because Wallace couldn't win. In late September,
"Thurmond Speaks" saturated the South with radio and television
commercials of Thurmond delivering that message... . Tom Turnipseed
(a Wallace campaign staffer) remembered Thurmond's spots as "very
effective" and that Wallace's poll numbers began falling almost
immediately. Wallace had led in the border states of North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Florida, as well as South Carolina -- states that
Nixon won, with a collective 45 electoral votes that exceeded his
margin of victory. Nixon squeaked by Wallace in North Carolina and
Tennessee, where Thurmond's role clearly made the difference, and
won more decisively in Florida. .‘.‘.
Thurmond carried South Carolina for Nixon, making it the only
state in the South to vote Republican in both the 1964 and 1968
presidential elections. Although the other Goldwater states from
1964 and Arkansas went to Wallace, Humphrey carried only Lyndon
Johnson's home state of Texas, and the other Southern states all
moved into Nixon's column...
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