The appearance of possible conflicts of interest created by lawyers who serve in the Legislature isn't as sweeping as it was 30 years ago when 30 of 46 state senators and 44 of 124 House members were attorneys. Thus, fewer lawyer-legislators now than then plead cases for clients before judges they help put on the bench and before state agency boards they help create.

But lawyer-legislators still cut a considerable swath in state government, as The State newspaper recently reported. Last year they raked in $2.4 million in attorney fees representing clients before state commissions and boards. And in their private practice many of these attorneys regularly pleaded cases before judges who lobbied them to be named to the bench and will be lobbying them to stay on the bench when judicial terms expire.

This isn't illegal. And in South Carolina's political culture that used to indulge much worse, it's not even considered unethical. But plainly there is an appearance of possible conflict of interest, and an unfairness to the parties of disputes whose attorneys aren't legislators. Plus, even when a judge or state body rightly rules for a lawyer-legislator's client, some suspicion of favoritism falls on the ruling authority.

This problem is rooted in history. It's the result of long ago executive branch abuses, popular rebellion and constitutional changes. For this, South Carolina's Legislature became vested with far greater power, the state's governor wields far less, and the judicial branch is less independent than their counterparts in all but three or four other states. One such change vested power in the Legislature to both elect and retain judges, a power that in most states is wisely divided.

Lawyer-legislators wield far greater influence than their numbers, even though they are now down to 12 in the Senate and 22 in the House, according to The State. Lay lawmakers have occasional contact with judges, and usually no remarkable associations with them. Attorneys in the Legislature are constants in the lives of judges, and both have reasons to ingratiate themselves to each other.

The professional knowledge possessed by lawyers makes them valuable in the legislative election of judges. But their votes and their advice to lay colleagues on re-election of judges denies the judiciary full independence as a co-equal branch of government.

The observed lobbying of lawmakers by candidates for the bench and for re-election is unseemly in the extreme. It holds the judicial branch up for ridicule by lawmakers who undoubtedly convey their feelings more widely. And the regular profitable pleading of causes to state agency authorities by lawyer-legislators hints at favor seeking and routine tolerance of it that's just as harmful to public confidence in good government.