

From: Shwedo, Kevin A <Kevin.Shwedo@scdmv.net>

To: Haley, Nikkigovhaley@gov.sc.gov

CC: Patel, SwatiSwatiPatel@gov.sc.gov

Smith, AustinAustinSmith@gov.sc.gov

Baker, JoshJoshBaker@gov.sc.gov

Pisarik, HollyHollyPisarik@gov.sc.gov

Veldran, KatherineKatherineVeldran@gov.sc.gov

Sanderson, JeffreyJeffrey.Sanderson@scdr.sc.gov

Beatty, DanDan.Beatty@scdr.sc.gov

Date: 1/22/2016 9:40:23 PM

Subject: Long Term Recovery Situation Report (SITREP #9)

Attachments: 160121 Draft SCDR Long-term Recovery timeline.pptx

Governor - this week's SITREP for your review and comments:

1. Disaster Recovery Centers – EMD has been working hard with each of the counties to ensure each survivor gets the support they need to file their claims. There appears to be consensus from the County Administrators that we met their requirements and they have recommended closure of the remaining sites (Georgetown, Sumter, Richland and Williamsburg). To ensure that all needs continue to be fulfilled, each county will receive support by the Long Term Recovery Groups, County Emergency Managers, 211, the FEMA 1-800 Helpline, disaster legal services, State Department of Insurance and the disaster assistance website for all unmet needs. I will contact Austin on Monday to ensure we are not overlooking any of your concerns. If approval is received, State\FEMA External Affairs will conduct a messaging campaign to draw out any survivor still in need and give guidance on what to do post DRC operations.
2. We received some very informal insight into the CDBG allocation delay. It appears that HUD is mulling a split of the award between the state and city of Columbia. I would recommend arguing for the efficiency and stewardship of tax dollars and keep it all centralized at the state level. A split award will lead to duplicative administrations, duplicative procurements, and unnecessary applicant confusion. I am told it was split during a previous disaster in both Houston and Galveston – several have identified these as good examples of failed municipal awards that ultimately led to waste and state takeover.
3. We requested and received a large amount of updated data from FEMA specifically focused on Individual Assistance. We will use the data to enhance our Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) analysis as we attempt to discern those who were deemed ineligible. We received all of the ineligibility codes so we should be able to determine many of the “why’s” associated with those deemed ineligible. Additionally, we plan on updating our common operating picture with FEMA verified losses of over \$5K, and working on

building specific county vulnerability analysis. This is our first attempt to try to identify why our average award is just around \$3K per individual, while other similar disasters average \$6K AND to determine why only about 26% of our population received these FEMA grants, when anecdotally (from members of the FEMA team providing discreet information) other similar disasters average between 50 and 70%.

4. We have developed three key products over the past week that we are reviewing and preparing for coordination and staffing state-wide.
 - a. We developed the State Disaster Recovery Framework based upon the National Disaster Recovery Framework. This is a strategic document which outlines three central focal points for our States Long Term Recovery. First, we believe strongly in local primacy. Each community has the right to self-determination and our mission is to educate, advise, assist, and resource as appropriate. Second, we focus on apolitical vulnerability. Using our SoVI methodology, and knowing we will run out of resources before we run out of needs, we prioritize our efforts toward those who are the most vulnerable and will not overcome this disaster without assistance. Finally, partnerships are critical. We must continue our engagement with a myriad of Federal agencies, continue to coordinate with the cabinet level agencies, VOADs, and all facets of municipal and county government. We hope to brief you on the draft concept immediately following our staffing efforts. We know that this document will continue to grow and mature over time, but will become the basis on how we deal with both the Federal and County entities.
 - b. The second document we completed this week was our Disaster Recovery Strategy. This combines our essential task with the ways, means and desired end state of our recovery. We anticipate this document (once thoroughly staffed throughout state government) serving as a baseline strategy for all future disaster recovery missions as well as for this specific disaster recovery.
 - c. The third document reflects the most optimistic timeline for recovery based upon grant guidelines established by the Federal Government – (attached) – we hope to have a brief discussion about this as well.
5. We are continuing to engage county administrators. Today, I visited with Charleston County and next week we have meetings scheduled with both Georgetown and Williamsburg Counties. Our talking points with each are similar: We reinforce local primacy, discuss social vulnerability, and reinforce the value of partnerships. Additionally, we encourage their interest in Long Term Community Recovery Committees and discuss community planning and the 'vision required' for long term community recovery. We have also covered the importance of managing expectations, especially Hazard Mitigation Grants, CDBG-DR funding timelines AND subsequent contracting expectations. Additionally, we are communicating with them via email and providing them with as

much assistance as we can.

6. We have struggled with contractor licensing issues. Many of the VOADs are national organizations and have general contracting capability inherent and resident within their recovery organizations. However, some don't and we have worked extensively with LLR to discern solutions. To date, we have two viable solutions that mitigate the problem. First, per law, anything under \$5K does not require the citizen to pull a permit or require a license. Those VOADs, which don't have general contractors, are using this as a scope of work condition until they get their folks licensed. Second, we have been pursuing a proviso that was codified into law last year which we continue to research. We are in discussions with LLR concerning this law and its applicability to this disaster. Under all circumstances and conditions, we must have laws on the books for the next disaster which encourage, simplify, and facilitate volunteer agencies which come to assist South Carolina.
7. The ongoing concern for the unmet needs housing recovery has centered on those who were denied FEMA eligibility due to pre-existing conditions (deferred maintenance), which is not covered under the FEMA Individual Assistance Program. On Wednesday, the Team identified and discussed the attributes of the RAPIDO House Model program with RAPIDO managers, and how best to address the pre-existing conditions issue.
 - a. Originally designed in the wake of the Texas disaster (Hurricane Ike), the RAPIDO model was designed as a quick low-cost housing rebuilding plan. As in the case of South Carolina's most vulnerable population, these types of disasters can leave low income families vulnerable for months and sometimes years as they wait on much-needed repairs and rebuilds. The RAPIDO model is a temporary-to-permanent housing design proto-type that enables families to move back into module shelters in a matter of days while a new, innovative designed home is built out around it. RAPIDO utilizes a holistic approach to disaster recovery to include outreach to the most vulnerable individuals and areas. Additionally, RAPIDO uses a long term care approach entitled "PRE-COVERY."
 - b. Texas' housing recovery utilized HUD grant funds for a pilot project to construct 20 homes for affected families in the south Texas and Houston areas who were ineligible for FEMA assistance due to deferred maintenance issues. In this project, the families were built a core unit (500 sq.ft. inclusive of a kitchen, bathroom, living and sleeping area) within six days at a cost of ranging from \$15K to \$18K each. Later, as time and money allowed, these core units were expanded into full homes (3 to 4 bedrooms) for an additional cost ranging from \$65K to \$95K (1,200 sq. ft., \$82K average). Because of the initial success of the pilot project, Texas contracted with RAPIDO ("on call") for immediate response in future disasters. In honesty, they do not appear to be houses that will stand the test of time, but they do appear to be solid options for about 10 years.

8. The OneSC Foundation received 48 applications requesting more than \$1.2 million in funding during the most recent round (2nd), which closed on January 8th. The Foundation will distribute another \$500K to VOADs and other groups to assist in the long term recovery for the flood victims. The third round of funding requests will open in March. While there were a few repeat requests, several new ones focused in the low country. As in previous disbursements the Foundation is only funding rebuilding and recovery.
9. The team has been meeting directly with individual county administrators to inform, assist, and advise local communities in their local primacy for long term recovery. One issue in particular which has been brought to our attention by the VOADs is an increasing number of counties are reporting that flood victims do not want to leave their homes in spite of the deplorable condition of their homes. On Monday (1/25), we will travel to Georgetown and Williamsburg to meet with county administrators. I am very concerned about the long term impact of mold and respiratory problems over time. More to follow.
10. Many long term recovery groups/committees are multi-county in nature, such as the Tri-County LTRG (Sumter, Clarendon, Lee) which is based on a relationship that has been in existence since 1937. However, what can work well for one region may not be the recipe for success in other situations. The FEMA VAL has previously held out the Edisto LTRG (Orangeburg, Bamberg, Calhoun, Allendale, Barnwell, and Aiken counties) as the "model" for others to emulate. Unfortunately, challenges to this "model" were revealed at the Edisto LTRG regional meeting this week when there was no representation from the business community and/or local government. What may look good on paper for FEMA to manage doesn't necessarily translate into an equal distribution of community leaders, business sector, and local government capability. For example, there is a clear imbalance of an economic base in the communities in Bamberg and Allendale, and those of Orangeburg and others. Additionally, many of the volunteers who participate in the Edisto LTRG do not live in these communities but commute from other areas (e.g., Charleston) to participate in the Edisto LTRG. When you have these disparities and the lack of capacity for a local community to take ownership as an equal at the table with other participants the ability to achieve success as a group is affected. We cannot tell them how to run these committees, BUT we will work long and hard to help coach and mentor them, especially as they run into road blocks.
11. During recent Long Term Recovery Group meetings the Team has also received concerns from local community leaders and VOADs about the delays and the progress of securing final approval for the Case Management funding from FEMA. While this grant program does not lie within the area of responsibility for the SCDRC, the Team has ensured that these concerns have been communicated back to FEMA and SCEMD to address. The key has been again, expectation management. Some are contracting directly to meet short term needs.
12. The "Recovery from Disaster: Local Community" train the trainer program will begin

on Tuesday (1/26) and run through Thursday (1/28). FEMA is deploying trainers from Emmetsburg, MD to lead the training efforts using our locally developed "How To" guide. We will have 14 members of our Team going through this training, along with business, faith-based, and county government leaders also in attendance.

13. Outstanding issues – we continue to track items that may require legislative support for future disasters:
 - a. REMOTE AREA MEDICAL™ (RAM™) would still like to provide free dentistry, vision care with eye glasses and medical consultations for individuals suffering economic hardship as a result of those floods. We will recommend legislation that would authorize the Governor to immediately activate this capability at the moment of the Declaration of Emergency.
 - b. Water Mission.ORG has created a proposal to "Pre-Permit Potable Water Treatment Equipment" for future Disaster Response in South Carolina that we hope to obtain assistance . We will use their template to recommend legislation authorizing the this capability on Declaration of Disaster.
 - c. We will also work with the VOADs to determine current impediments to construction that will make them more productive in future disasters. Initially, we will work with LLR to see what can be done through current regs and subsequently request emergency authority upon declaration of emergency.

Respectfully,
Kevin

Kevin A. Shwedo
South Carolina Disaster Recovery Coordinator
10311 Wilson Boulevard
Blythewood, South Carolina 29016

(O) 803-896-4039
(C) 803-609-4218

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