S.C. Chief Justice Jean Toal's dissenting opinion in Ed Robinson
Laundry and Dry Cleaning Inc. vs. S.C. Department of Revenue and the
state of South Carolina (issued Oct. 13) may not have held sway in
that case, but it is, in fact, a far more accurate description of
the nature of the state's range of sales tax exemptions than the
majority's opinion admits.
At issue in this case was Robinson's allegation that the state's
sales tax law violates the equal protection clauses of the S.C. and
U.S. Constitutions because the tax is not imposed upon all service
providers, only dry cleaners.
Robinson argued that similarly situated businesses were treated
differently (i.e., exempted from the tax) and that such disparate
treatment of dry cleaners had no rational basis and was therefore
unconstitutional.
Essentially, in cases such as these, the law says that such
disparate treatment is unconstitutional unless it bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate government purpose.
Although the majority did not find in favor of Robinson, it did
acknowledge that Robinson may be correct in noting such exemptions
[indicate] a misunderstanding of economics and are therefore unwise
in an economic sense. The majority did not find, however, that such
economic inequities were unconstitutional. This conclusion, however
legally sound it may be, once again demonstrates that good law
(i.e., that which is deemed constitutional) is not necessarily good
public policy; indeed, it may be the very antithesis of good public
policy.
At any rate, the fact that the sales tax law passed
constitutional muster does not indicate and should not be construed
by members of the General Assembly as indicating that the sales tax
law rests on a fundamentally sound basis. Declaring something
constitutional is not the same thing as arguing that it is good
public policy. Although it may not be riddled with unconstitutional
inequities, the law is nevertheless riddled with inequities that are
no less egregious.
Chief Justice Toal opined that not only was there no rational
basis for treating dry cleaning services differently from other
services, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the 61 exceptions to the sales tax law are arbitrary and capricious
and thus violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Again, the absence of a legal pronouncement in this case that the
state's sales-tax exemptions are arbitrary and capricious does not
mean that they are not arbitrary and capricious, just that there is
no judicial remedy for such flaws, only a legislative one.
How tax codes and laws evolve in the political and legislative
process - typically, one special interest concern after another
acceded to over time with little consideration of the relationship
of each to the whole - is an indication of the sales tax law's
likely arbitrariness. Everyone wants to carve out his safe haven in
such codes, much as the automobile dealers did in securing a cap on
the sales tax on automobiles during the debate over the 1-cent
increase in the sales tax brought about by the Education Improvement
Act in the early 1980s. There was clearly a political basis for that
concession, but I would hardly call it a rational basis. The same
can probably be said about many of the other exemptions as well.
Even if the law began with a rationally and well-thought-out
basis for its promulgation, when the changes over time are
considered as a whole and in the context of what a well-written
piece of legislation on the subject would look like, they indicate,
in Toal's words, whimsical treatment of various entities for tax
purposes.